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Abstract
The so-called ‘possibility proof’ in Kant’s pre-Critical Beweisgrund
has been widely discussed in the literature, and it is a common view that
he never really abandoned it. As I shall argue, this reading is mistaken.
I aim to show that the natural illusion in the Critique of Pure Reason,
which is usually taken to be the possibility proof turned into a transcen-
dental illusion, has both a different conclusion and a different argument
than the possibility proof. Rather, what remains fromBeweisgrund is what
I will call the ‘proof a posteriori’, which the Critique turns into a transcen-
dental illusion that is of regulative use for reason.
Keywords: rational theology, transcendental ideal, regulative use of
reason
1. Introduction
Kant is famous for rejecting all attempts at proving the existence of God.
In , however, the younger Kant proposed such a proof himself in
The Only Possible Ground of Proof for a Demonstration of the
Existence of God (or Beweisgrund, for short). This so-called ‘possibility
proof’ has recently received meticulous scrutiny and is, I think, quite
well-understood by now. In brief, Kant argues that all possibility must
be grounded in an absolutely necessary being and then identifies this
being with God. Surprisingly, though, Kant does not mention the
possibility proof in his refutation of the three possible proofs of God’s
existence in the Ideal chapter of the Critique (see A/B, A/
B). Even more confusingly, Kant now uses the designation ‘the only
possible ground of proof’ to refer to the ontological proof. Seemingly,
the possibility proof just disappears.
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Notwithstanding this, there is a wide agreement in the literature that
Kant does not really abandon the possibility proof in the Critique.
For example, Fisher and Watkins write:
Since the content of all other concepts is derived from limiting
the concept of the ens realissimum, all other possibilities are
derived from this original possibility, that is, all possibilities
are grounded in God. So, not only does Kant link the material
ground of possibility and God, but he does so in a way that
is fundamentally the same as he does in The Only Possible
Argument. (Fisher and Watkins : )
A passage in a transcript of Kant’s lectures on rational theology is often
cited as evidence for this view. There, he is reported to have said about the
possibility proof:
But even this proof is not apodictically certain; for it cannot
establish the objective necessity of such an original being, but
only the subjective necessity of assuming it. However, this proof
can in no way be refuted, because it has its ground in the nature
of human reason; for reason absolutely forces me to assume
a being which is the ground of everything possible, because
otherwise I could not cognize at all in what something is possible
(worin etwas möglich sey). (Th-Pölitz, : )
The transcript reads that the proof ‘can in no way be refuted’, which has
been taken to mean that Kant basically still endorses the possibility
proof.At the same time, however, he denies that the proof is ‘apodictically
certain’ because it can only establish the ‘subjective necessity of assuming’
the original being. On a widely held view, Kant now thinks that the proof
shows the subjective necessity of the idea of God as regards the regulative
use of the transcendental ideal, albeit without taking God to exist.
That is, the proof justifies the use of the idea of God, but only for the
regulative use of reason with regard to the unity of experience.
Despite this seemingly strong evidence, one should not assign too much
weight to students’ notes; and I shall argue that there are reasons to
be particularly suspicious in this case. If we want to discern Kant’s
considered view, we have to look not into the transcripts, but the
Critique. This task is quite difficult, though, because many strands of
arguments run together there. To my mind, there are four main threads
that we need to disentangle, namely discussions of:
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(a) a legitimate concept of God as the ens realissimum who does not
possess sensible reality, but nonetheless is the ground of possibility;
(b) an illegitimate concept of God as the sum total (Inbegriff) of
sensible reality that stems from a ‘natural illusion’;
(c) an illegitimate ‘natural course of human reason’ (and the associated
proofs) that seeks to establish the existence of God in the legitimate
sense;
(d) a legitimate regulative use by reason of the legitimate idea of God
that rests on the transcendental illusion that he is the ground of
the order of the world.
Many readers fail to distinguish these threads, but keeping them separate
is crucial. For I shall argue that what remains fromBeweisgrund is not the
possibility proof. What readers take to remain of it is only a transcen-
dental illusion that suggests (b) a Spinozistic God. But there is another
proof in Beweisgrund that is more influential in the Critique, yet has
received far less scholarly attention: that is the ‘proof a posteriori’
(as I shall call it), the predecessor of the Critique’s physico-theological
proof. According to the proof a posteriori, we can cognize empirically
that God exists and is the ground of the order and harmony of the world.
Although Kant rejects the related physico-theological proof in the
Critique as well (c), he holds at the same time that the latter gives rise to
a necessary transcendental illusion that has a positive function for the
regulative, albeit not constitutive use of reason in regard to the empirical
world (d). So what remains from Beweisgrund is the proof a posteriori
(albeit in a modified form), which is turned into a transcendental illusion
that has a legitimate regulative use.
In what follows, I will first present the two proofs in Beweisgrund before
I consider the four threads in the Ideal. It will turn out in the conclusion
that the account from the Pölitz transcript differs markedly from the
Critique.My hope is that this article contributes to a better understanding
of the Ideal chapter. Unfortunately, textual limitations forceme to restrict
my discussion to issues that are central for the relation of Beweisgrund to
the Critique. Hence, there are many aspects or texts that I cannot discuss
in as much detail as I would like.
2. The Possibility Proof and the Proof A Posteriori in Beweisgrund
In Beweisgrund, Kant discusses two proofs in detail. The first section of
Beweisgrund is dedicated to what is known as the ‘possibility proof’.
In its most simple form, the proof, which runs from the sheer possibility
of something to God’s existence, can be summarized as follows:
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(1) Something is possible.
(2) If something is possible, then this possibility must be grounded in an
absolutely necessary being.
(3) There is an absolutely necessary being that grounds all possibility.
(4) If there is an absolutely necessary being that grounds all possibility, this
being is God.
(5) God exists.
So the possibility proof consists of two main steps: first, it argues
for the existence of an absolutely necessary being as the ground of
possibility, and then it shows that this being is God. The literature is
full of discussion about potential problems of the proof and how they
could be avoided, but this is not my business here. I can also abstract
from the hotly debated topic how God grounds possibility. Yet,
there is one point that is relevant for my purposes. Some proponents
of the debate hold that the God of the possibility proof grounds all
realities by instantiating them, which faces the threat of Spinozism,
according to which (as Kant understood it) the world is God.
However, Kant holds that God contains the ‘ultimate real ground of
all other possibility’ (OPA, : ; cf. : , , ) and argues that these
worldly possibilities are not instantiated by God (: –). This rules
out that God instantiates all possibilities and is, in effect, identical to
the world.
The second proof is the topic of the very lengthy second section of
Beweisgrund, and Kant introduces this proof by way of concluding the
first section:
But if we, through amature assessment of the essential properties
of the things that we get acquainted with through experience,
perceive unity in the manifold and harmony in the separated
even in the necessary determinations of their internal possibility,
then we will be able to infer back to a unified principle of all
possibility through the way of cognition a posteriori and
ultimately arrive at the same fundamental concept of absolutely
necessary existence from which we initially departed through
the way a priori. Now our intention shall be to see whether a
necessary relation towards order and harmony is to be encoun-
tered even in the internal possibility of things, and in this
immense manifold unity, so that we can judge from it whether
the essences of things themselves reveal a supreme common
ground. (OPA, : )
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The possibility proof is a priori because it derives the consequence of
God’s creation from his essence, by which he grounds them. The second
proof, by contrast, is a posteriori because it derives God as the ground of
the world from the consequences.Thus, I will call this proof the ‘proof a
posteriori’, which considers the great harmony in the essences of things
and concludes that they must be grounded in an absolutely necessary
being. It is not really clear what logical form the proof a posteriori is
supposed to have, but Kant says that in this proof ‘both the existence
and the properties of it are immediately inferred’ from experience
(OPA, : ). Thus, I assume that the proof can be summarized as
follows:
(1) The actual world has a unified principle of its possibility.
(2) If the world has a unified principle of possibility, God (the
absolutely necessary ground of the unity of possibility) exists.
(3) God exists.
Premise () is primarily based on the order of geometry (OPA, : –)
andmechanics (: –), insofar as the unity that we encounter there is
‘itself grounded in the possibilities of things’ (: ), as opposed to an
order that ‘is considered contingent and originating from the choice of an
intelligent being’ (: ). The difference between these kinds of orders
is central here. The second order is called ‘moral’ because this order is
contingent and depends on God’s choice. By contrast, the first order is
‘non-moral’ (unmoralisch); the order is grounded in the natures of things
and not dependent onGod’s choice, but his essence (: ). According to
Kant, the moral order could at most prove the existence of a ‘craftsman,
but not of a creator of the world’ (: ); so the proof a posteriorimust
be based on the non-moral order (: –, –). Kant criticizes
traditional physico-theology (the branch of theology that tries to cognize
God through his supposed works) for merely considering the moral order
(: –) and advocates an improvedmethod of physico-theology that
seeks out the non-moral order of the world (: –).
As regards premise (), Kant answers the question, ‘Is this unity : : :
possible without dependency from a wise author?’, by flatly responding,
‘The formal [aspect] of such great and manifold regularity prohibits this’
(: ). So Kant does not give an elaborate answer to the question why
the great harmony of the world must be grounded by God. However,
he does not consider the proof a posteriori to be sound anyway. Although
Kant contends that the proof is ‘possible’ and ‘in every way worthy to be
brought to proper perfection through united efforts’ (: ), he holds
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that the proof is ‘incapable of mathematical certainty and precision’
(: ). The reason is that ‘we are not acquainted with all created
things (alles Erschaffene)’ (: ), from which follows that we do not
know if the world really has a unified principle of possibility. Premise ()
is therefore uncertain, even if highly probable; and as a result, the whole
proof is uncertain – not even considering premise (), which may also be
problematic.
Again, I do not intend to discuss the two proofs in detail; I only outline
them for the sake of discussing their afterlife in the Critique. Let us now
turn to the first of the four threads of thought that I presented in the
introduction.
3. The Procedure of Forming the Legitimate Concept of the Ens
Realissimum
In section two of the Ideal, Kant describes a procedure of forming the
‘transcendental ideal’, that is, the concept of God. As this procedure is
described at length by other authors (with whom I generally agree),
I only give a brief summary of it here. Every predicate is either positive or
negative. Positive predicates are ‘transcendental affirmations’, whereas
negative predicates are ‘transcendental negations’. Whilst a transcen-
dental affirmation ‘expresses a being, and hence it is called reality
(thinghood)’, a transcendental negation ‘signifies a mere lack’ of reality
(A–/B–). All realities taken together form the ‘all of reality’
(A/B); and the being that instantiates all realities is the ens
realissimum (A/B), which is God. Thus, we attain the transcen-
dental ideal (as the concept of God) by forming the concept that contains
all transcendental affirmations.
However, Kant distinguishes between two conceptions of the ens
realissimum:
The transcendental concept of God, as the ens realissimum,
cannot be circumvented in philosophy : : : The question now
arises: am I to think of God as the sum total (complexus,
aggregatum) of all realities, or as the supreme ground of them?
(RPT, : n.)
Kant then rejects the first conception because it results in a self-
contradictory concept of God. As Kant argues in the Ideal, ‘our whole
sensibility, including all reality in appearance : : : cannot belong to
the idea of a highest being as an ingredient’ (A/B). Rather,
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‘the highest reality would ground the possibility of all things as a ground
and not as a sum total’ (A/B). I can only give a sketch of Kant’s
argument here. God is not only the ens realissimum, but also the ‘original
being’ (ens originarium), that is, the ‘origin of all things’ (PM, : ).
If the original being instantiated all realities, including sensible ones, ‘then
the original being would be regarded as a mere aggregate of derivative
beings’, which is ‘impossible’ (A/B). If we conceive of the ens
realissimum as a sum total of reality, we end at Spinozism. Thus, this
conception of God is inconsistent and hence illegitimate.
According to the legitimate conception, on the contrary, the ens
realissimum instantiates only so-called ‘pure’ realities and is the ground
of all limited realities, just as in Beweisgrund. For having a reality is not a
matter of an either-or. Rather, there are degrees of reality (they have an
‘intensive magnitude’, B). Kant thinks that only God possesses ‘pure’
realities, that is, realities of the highest degree. All realities of things in
space and time, on the contrary, are not pure, but limited: ‘there is no
thing in the whole world that has pure reality’ (Th-Pölitz, : ).
The notion of an ens realissimum as the sum total of all pure realities
(and the ground of all others) is consistent, according to Kant, because
pure realities cannot contradict each other. So it is only this conception
that can legitimately be the object of belief or of proofs of God’s existence.
It is not uncommon to read the formation of the transcendental ideal
as a process that occurs by virtue of a natural illusion. But this
strikes me as false. For the discussion of the formation of the transcen-
dental ideal is already completed when Kant first uses the word ‘illusion’
(at A/B). Consequently, we should assume that the legitimate
concept of God as the ground of possibility is formed independently of
an illusion. As we shall see in section , there is nonetheless an illusion
attached to this idea as well. But now let us turn to the infamously
complex and difficult illusion that Kant describes at the end of section two
of the Ideal. I will argue that this illusion only concerns the illegitimate
conception of God.
4. The Natural Illusion Leading to the Illegitimate Conception
of the Ens Realissimum
The second section of the Ideal not only provides a procedure by which
the legitimate concept of God can be formed, but also deals with a natural
illusion that arises from our subjective needs as regards the formation of
concepts. These two issues are deeply interwoven. According to Kant,
the ‘principle of thoroughgoing determination’ (PTD) requires that
THE POSS IB IL ITY PROOF IS NOT WHAT REMAINS FROM KANT ’S BEWEISGRUND
VOLUME 25 – 2 KANTIAN REVIEW 225
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000059
the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. HU Humboldt Universitat Zu Berlin, on 29 Jan 2021 at 16:57:42, subject to
‘among all possible predicates of things, insofar as they are compared
with their opposites, one must apply to it’ (A–/B–). Since
Kant later in the text clarifies that he is talking about transcendental
affirmations and negations, the PTD holds in fact that everything is
completely determined with regard to each pair of transcendental
affirmations and their negations. A concept of a thing that is determined
with respect to all of these pairs is called a ‘complete concept’ (A/
B). The transcendental ideal, as the concept of the ens realissimum,
represents the all of reality and is the sole complete concept that only has
transcendental affirmations – this is how it is defined. But every complete
concept of worldly things contains some transcendental affirmations
along with some transcendental negations.
NowKant holds that one can think the absence of reality only if one has a
concept of this reality. For example, ‘The person blind from birth cannot
form the least representation of darkness, because he has no representa-
tion of light’ (A/B). This lends a crucial role to the idea of an
‘all of reality’ that is the sum of all transcendental affirmations. All other
concepts are limitations of the all of reality because they contain
negations of some reality that belong to the all of reality. For this reason,
Kant metaphorically refers to the all of reality as ‘the entire storehouse of
material from which all possible predicates of things can be taken’
(A/B). But he insists:
It goes without saying that with this aim – namely, solely that of
representing the necessary thoroughgoing determination of
things – reason does not presuppose the existence of a being
conforming to the ideal, but only the idea of such a being, in
order to derive from an unconditioned totality of thoroughgoing
determination the conditioned totality, i.e., that of the limited.
(A–/B–)
What is noteworthy here is not only that this requirement of reason
gives us no warrant for assuming God’s existence, but also that the
relation between the ‘unconditioned totality’ (the all of transcendental
affirmations) and the ‘conditioned totality’ (the limited concepts) is one
between concepts and not between things. This needs further explanation.
The PTD demands of every possible reality that we are able to determine
whether it belongs to a thing or not. For we can form a limited concept
only by limiting an unlimited reality in thought; and if we assume that
all unlimited realities can be limited, it follows that the legitimate concept
of God (as the sumof all pure realities) must be possible if the totality of all
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limited concepts is to be possible. This does not mean that we must form
the transcendental ideal before we can form limited concepts. Rather,
it means that the possibility of the totality of all possible limited concepts
presupposes thepossibility of the totality of all possible unlimited concepts
(that is, the transcendental ideal).
This is not a metaphysical grounding relation between God and the
world, in the sense that God would ground possibility by instantiating
the realities of worldly objects. Kant admits that his initial presentation
of the relation between the all of reality and limited concepts suggests that
this is the way God grounds possibility, but parenthetically remarks that
this has only been the ‘first crude outline’ of the story (A/B). For
‘the derivation of all other possibility from this original being, strictly
speaking, also cannot be regarded as a limitation of its highest reality
and as a division, as it were, of it’ (A/B). God is not the
‘storehouse’ who grounds possibility by offering the material for limita-
tion, but the ground of possibility outside the world.
Yet Kant’s revision of the ‘first crude outline’ affects not only the ground-
ing relation between God and the world, but also the grounding relation
between the transcendental ideal and limited concepts. For Kant now says
that the ‘manifoldness’ of worldly things ‘rests not on the limitation of the
original being itself, but on its complete consequences’ (A/B).
The ‘complete consequences’ of God are the world and everything that
is possible through him (A/B). But this means that the ‘entire
storehouse’ on which the limitation of concepts depends is the all of
sensible reality, not the all of pure reality that constitutes the legitimate
concept of God. As we shall see now, the all of sensible reality is at the
heart of the infamous ‘illusion’ of reason (A/B) at the end of
section two; and I shall argue that this illusion attempts to establish the
existence of the ens realissimum in the flawed, Spinozistic sense.
Kant begins his discussion of the illusion by raising a question:
Therefore I ask: How does reason come to regard all the
possibility of things as derived from a single possibility that lies
at the bottom, namely that of the highest reality, and then to
presuppose this as contained in a particular original being?
(A/B)
Crucially, the transcendental ideal (and the illusion attached to it)
‘is grounded on a natural and not a merely arbitrary idea’ (A/B).
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AsGrier has pointed out, reason has an interest in pursuing the totality of
conditions, even though we cannot reach it in experience. Therefore, the
transcendental ideas of the soul, the world and God are necessary
illusions – they seem to be the unconditioned that reason demands
(and this semblance is unavoidable), but it would be an error to judge that
the unconditioned is, or even could be, given in experience. So we have to
distinguish between transcendental illusions, which are unavoidable but
are not judgements, and transcendental errors, which are motivated by
illusions but avoidable.
The illusion in section two turns on the PTD. For we can form the
complete concept of a thing only if we compare it with all possible sensible
realities (as shown above). Thus, we must possess the concepts of all
sensible realities in order to decidewhether a transcendental affirmation or
its negation applies to a given thing. Sincewe can becomeacquaintedwith
realities only by experience, these realities must ‘be presupposed as given
in one sum total’ (A/B) as the enabling condition of the formation
of sensible concepts. Thus, Kant thinks that the conditioned totality of
sensible concepts presupposes as its condition that all the realities repre-
sented by positive sensible concepts are actually instantiated. But there is
an illusion involved in the argument that Kant does not make explicit,
namely the illusion that we can in fact determine a complete concept.
While introducing the PTD at the beginning of section two, he remarks:
Thoroughgoing determination is consequently a concept that
we can never exhibit in concreto in its totality, and thus it is
grounded on an idea which has its seat solely in reason, which
prescribes to the understanding the rule of its complete use.
(A/B)
Although the task for reason to form complete concepts cannot be
fulfilled, the idea of a complete concept is a necessary illusion that serves
as a regulative idea for the use of the understanding. Unfortunately, Kant
does not say why this goal is unachievable. But as we have seen, it is a
necessary condition of forming complete concepts that the all of sensible
reality is given in a sum total. Since Kant speaks of the ‘idea of the sum
total of all reality’ (A/B) and ideas are concepts of reason that can
have no corresponding object in experience (A/B, A/B),
this suggests that Kant thinks that the all of sensible reality can never
be given in experience. But since reason can only form a complete concept
if the all of sensible reality is given, we are prone to the illusion that the
latter is the case.
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However, this does not yet account for an illusion that God exists, which
is only accomplished by a series of further illusions. First, we think that
the sum total of the realities we can become acquainted with – that is, the
sum total of sensible realities – is the sum total of realities in general.
However, this is an illusion because the sum total of sensible realities does
not include the noumenal realities of things in themselves, let alone the
pure realities that are constitutive of the legitimate concept of God.
And further illusions (that I do not need to discuss here) lead to mistaking
this sum total of sensible realities for God (A–/B–). Hence, the
illusory argument would establish not only that the all of sensible reality
is grounded by God, but even that the all of these realities itself is God.
This would establish Spinozism, which Kant condemns.
In conclusion, section two of the Ideal discusses four different grounding
relations:
(i) the grounding relation by which the totality of the concepts of pure
realities makes the totality of the concepts of limited realities
possible;
(ii) the grounding relation by which the totality of positive sensible con-
cepts makes the totality of sensible concepts possible;
(iii) the grounding relation by which the sum total of sensible realities
makes the totality of sensible concepts possible;
(iv) the grounding relation by which God grounds worldly possibilities.
Relation (i) does not establish the existence of any object, but only the
necessity of a particular concept; however, Kant ultimately sets this
relation aside in favour of relation (ii) because sensible concepts are
not limitations of pure realities.Relation (iii) figures in a transcendental
illusion that we can actually determine the complete concept of a
thing, but only further illusions make us identify the sum total of
sensible realities with a Spinozistic God. Relation (iv) is only a by-product
of Kant’s discussion; he merely suggests that (iv) is part of the legitimate
concept of God, and the transcendental illusion in section two does not
involve this relation.
But if we look back to Beweisgrund, the possibility proof would
establish (iv), but not the other grounding relations. Recall that this proof
argues that there must be an absolutely necessary being that is the ground
of worldly possibilities. This is an entirely different kind of grounding than
grounding the possibility of concepts by providing the sensible material.
Furthermore, while the God of the possibility proof is separate from the
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world, the God of the transcendental illusion is identical to the sensible
world. Hence, it is not the case that the possibility proof is reincarnated
in the form of the transcendental illusion in section two of the Ideal.
5. The Natural Course of Reason that Attempts to Prove God’s
Existence
Section three of the Ideal has received scant scholarly attention. The main
reason may be that its function has been unclear. Indeed, it is not easy to
see why section three is not somehow redundant. The title, ‘On the
grounds of proof of speculative reason for inferring the existence of a
highest being’ (A/B), may suggest that the section just introduces
and pre-summarizes the refutations of the ontological, cosmological and
physico-theological proofs to come. On the other hand, since it deals
with a ‘natural course taken by every human reason’ (A/B;
cf. A/B, A/B), one might think that the third section
extends the natural illusion Kant discussed in section two. But none
of this holds. On my view, section three introduces an illusion that is
different and independently motivated from the illusion in section two.
For the latter attempts to establish a flawed idea of God, whereas the
former provides a flawed ground of proof for taking the legitimate idea
of God to correspond to an actually existing being. Therefore, it is only
the illusion in section three that gives rise to the three attempts at proving
the existence of the ens realissimum in the legitimate sense.
Kant distinguishes the two illusions as follows:
In spite of its urgent need to presuppose something that
the understanding could take as the complete ground for the
thoroughgoing determination of its concepts, reason notices the
ideal and merely fictive character of such a presupposition much
too easily to allow itself to be persuaded by this alone straight-
way to assume amere creature of its own thinking to be an actual
being, were it not urged through something else to seek some-
where for a resting place in the regress from the conditioned,
which is given, to the unconditioned : : : (A–/B–)
Kant does not consider the natural illusion in section two as a potential
proof of God because, I take it, the idea of God as a sum total is self-
contradictory; a proof based on this idea would be a non-starter.
In section three, however, Kant discusses a ‘natural course’ of thinking
that, if successful, would prove the existence of God in the legitimate
sense. The natural course is a series of two illusions. It begins with
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‘common experience’ and seeks for an ‘absolutely necessary being’ that
grounds the conditioned beings in experience (A/B). Then, by a
further step, we have the illusion that this being is the ens realissimum,
which makes us conclude that the ‘being of the highest reality’ is the most
plausible candidate for the absolutely necessary being (A/B).
Unsurprisingly, Kant thinks that this ‘natural’ way of proving the
existence of God is mistaken (A–/B–), even though he credits
it for having ‘a certain cogency’.
By contrast, some readers hold that the series of illusions in sections two
and three are different steps of one extended argument. On their view, it is
precisely the failure of the argument from section two to establish a
legitimate concept of God which gives rise to another illusion.
However, there seems to be a dilemma for their position. Either the
natural course is just an extension of the preceding illusion in section two,
but then we would still be committed to the illusion that God is the sum
total of sensible realities. Or God is not the sum total of realities, but
then it is unclear why the illusions are not independent from each other.
The obvious solution for this dilemma is to accept that these illusions are
separate.
What makes the natural course of reason relevant for the rest of the Ideal
is that Kant apparently builds the classification of the proofs of God’s
existence on it:
All paths on which one may set forth with this aim either begin
from determinate experience and the special constitution of our
world of sense known through it, and ascend from that bymeans
of laws of causality to the highest cause outside the world; or else
they are empirically grounded on an experience that is only
indeterminate, i.e., on some existence; or, finally, they abstract
from all experience and infer the existence of a highest cause
entirely a priori from mere concepts. The first proof is the
physico-theological, the second the cosmological, and the third
the ontological proof. There are no more of them, and there also
cannot be any more. : : : As to the order in which these species of
proof have to be presented for examination, however, it will be
just the reverse of that taken by reason in gradually unfolding
itself, and inwhichwe have first placed them. (A–/B–)
By speaking of ‘reason in gradually unfolding itself’, Kant plainly refers to
the natural course of reason. The title of section three indicates that the
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section presents the ‘grounds of proof’ concerning the existence of God,
which, in this context, means as much as a rough sketch of the
argument(s). Arguably, the natural course of reason provides this
ground of proof; and the three attempted proofs Kant aims to refute
are motivated by the natural course. There is also an order in these
proofs that corresponds to the natural course. For the physico-theological
proof, which starts from experience, entails the cosmological proof,
which in turn entails the ontological proof. Kant’s argumentative strategy
is to show that the ontological proof fails and then that the other
proofs entail the ontological proof, so they fail, too (A–/B–,
A/B, A–/B–).
The physico-theological proof strongly resembles the proof a posteriori
from Beweisgrund. We find a ‘purposive order’ in the world that is:
quite foreign to the things of theworld, and pertains to themonly
contingently, i.e., the natures of different things could not by
themselves agree in so many united means to determinate final
aims, were they not quite properly chosen for and predisposed
to it through a principle of rational order grounded on ideas.
(A/B)
Therefore, we conclude that there exists at least one being that possesses
the great wisdom that is required to produce such an order. And because
of the unity of this order there can only be one such being, namely God.
We can summarize the beginning of Kant’s reconstruction of the physico-
theological proof as follows:
(1) The actual world displays an order that is only possible if there
is a ‘wise cause’ (A625/B653) that grounds this order. Call this a
‘Wise Author’.
(2) There is at least one Wise Author.
(3) The unity of the world order reveals that there is only one
Wise Author.
(4) There is exactly one Wise Author.
The physico-theological proof clearly corresponds to the natural course
of reason: it begins by experience and seeks for an unconditioned ground
of the order of nature. But so far the proof is incomplete: it has not yet
shown that the Wise Author is an absolutely necessary being, let alone
God. And Kant’s refutation of the physico-theological proof is based
on the claim that this gap cannot be bridged empirically.
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Unfortunately, the structure of the refutation is not very clear. In any case,
Kant seems to reject two different arguments that depend on two different
ways of conceiving of the Wise Author. These ways correspond to what
Beweisgrund considered the bad and the improved method of physico-
theology, respectively. The first argument makes an ‘inference : : :
from the analogy between natural products and those of human art’
(A/B). While Kant rejects this method, he holds that ‘once we
are supposed to name a cause, we could not proceed more securely than
by analogy with such purposive productions, which are the only ones
where we are fully acquainted with the causes and the way they act’
(A/B). Yet this argument does not bring us very far. For it could:
prove merely the contingency of the form, but not of the matter,
i.e., of substance, in the world; for the latter would further
require that it be able to be proved that the things of the world
would in themselves be unsuited for such an order and harmony
according to universal laws if theywere not in their substance the
product of a highest wisdom. (A–/–)
Consequently, the proof ‘could at most establish an architect of the
world, whowould always be very limited by the suitability of thematerial
on which he works, but not a creator of the world’ (A/B). A mere
architect of the world could not be God because the architect has defects.
In order to show that there is a creator, we have to prove ‘the contingency
of matter itself’, and not only of the form in which nature is arranged
(A/B). That matter is contingent means that it is dependent on
a creator as its cause (A/B); and the Wise Author can only be
God if he is the creator of matter, and hence of the world. We thus
need to find a way that keeps the physico-theological proof empirical
(as intended), but avoids the trap of the analogy with human artefacts.
For this reason, Kant goes on to discuss the second argument that he
rejects, which ‘goes from the thoroughgoing order and purposiveness
that is to be observed in the world, as a thoroughly contingent arrange-
ment, to the existence of a cause proportioned to it’ (A/B). This
argument apparently makes empirical inferences from the harmony in
substances (and their essences and laws). Unlike the first argument,
it does not conceive of the Wise Author by analogy with human
craftsmen. Still, Kant argues that the argument must provide us with
the concept of a being that has ‘all perfection’ (A/B). But what
we could get by this method at most is the existence of a being with
‘very great : : : power and excellence’ (A/B) – make the world
THE POSS IB IL ITY PROOF IS NOT WHAT REMAINS FROM KANT ’S BEWEISGRUND
VOLUME 25 – 2 KANTIAN REVIEW 233
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415420000059
the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. 
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. HU Humboldt Universitat Zu Berlin, on 29 Jan 2021 at 16:57:42, subject to
as great as you want, we can always assume that its cause is just a very
powerful finite being, not the infinite being that possesses all reality.
Hence, the only way to save the physico-theological proof is by appealing
to the cosmological proof (A/B), so the former must proceed as
follows:
(5) The Wise Author is the creator of the world.
(6) The creator of the world is the absolutely necessary being.
(7) The absolutely necessary being is God.
(8) God exists.
Therefore, we have to account for propositions ()–(), which, if at all,
could only be accomplished by the cosmological proof. As a result, the
physico-theological proof entails the cosmological proof and is not
independent of it. This is the key difference between the physico-
theological proof and the proof a posteriori fromBeweisgrund – the latter
gave no account of why a unified principle of possibility requires the
existence of God, whereas the former acknowledges that this can only
be accounted for by the cosmological proof. Otherwise, the proof
a posteriori and the physico-theological proof are closely related, as they
attempt to prove God by relying on an improved method of physico-
theology. Common to both is also Kant’s criticism of them: there is
always a gap in the inference from the actual world to themost real being.
I do not further follow Kant’s refutations because the cosmological and
even more the ontological proof are widely discussed and well-
understood. What makes the physico-theological proof interesting in
particular is that Kant attributes a positive role to it. For he says that
the proof ‘enlivens the study of nature’ and offers a ‘guiding thread of
a particular unity whose principle is outside nature’ (A/B). Kant
discusses this positive function of the proof in the Appendix to the
Transcendental Dialectic, to which we now turn.
6. The Regulative Function of the Transcendental Ideal
Despite the failure to prove God’s existence, the transcendental ideal has
an indispensable positive function for empirical cognition. According
to Kant, reason, in its real use, seeks for the unconditioned that is the
condition of all conditioned beings; therefore, reason demands the
existence of certain objects that are represented by ‘transcendental ideas’
(A/B). However, no adequate object can be given to transcen-
dental ideas in experience – to this extent, reason is ‘dialectic’ and of
no ‘constitutive’ use because reason cannot establish the existence of
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the unconditioned (Aff./Bff.). Notwithstanding this, there is a
‘regulative’ use of reason, as Kant argues in the Appendix to the
Transcendental Dialectic. That is, the principles of reason do not
establish the existence of an object in experience, but only direct the
use of the understanding with regard to experience. The transcendental
ideas have a positive and indispensable role for the regulative use of
reason because they ground a necessary illusion (namely, that the uncon-
ditioned exists in experience) and, as it were, a focus imaginarius which
reason seeks to approximate as far as possible (A–/B–).
This is a vast topic, and I will not elaborate on it further. But the idea that
God grounds the order and harmony of the world is such a necessary
illusion that is of regulative use for reason:
Finally and thirdly, (in regard to theology) we have to consider
everything that might ever belong to the context of possible
experience as if this experience constituted an absolute unity,
but one dependent through and through, and always still
conditioned within the world of sense, yet at the same time as
if the sum total of all appearances (the world of sense itself)
had a single supreme and all-sufficient ground outside its range,
namely an independent, original, and creative reason, as it were,
in relation towhichwe direct every empirical use of our reason in
its greatest extension as if the objects themselves had arisen from
that original image of all reason. (A–/B–)
Apparently, the unity of experience is basically the same as the unity and
harmony in essences that we are acquainted with from Beweisgrund.
But now, Kant not only thinks that we cannot cognize the unity, but that
it is even impossible that this unity can ever be realized in the world.
Rather, the unity is an illusory task set by reason. For the ‘systematic
complete unity’ of experience is an ‘idea’ (A/B); and since an idea
is a non-empirical concept ‘which goes beyond the possibility of
experience’ (A/B), the systematic unity ‘can never be presented
adequately in experience’ (A/B). Therefore, it is only an (albeit
necessary) illusion that God is the ground of the assumed unity.
So Kant presents two transcendental illusions in the Ideal that must be
well distinguished: first, an illusion that God exists as the sum total of
sensible realities, second, an illusion that God exists as the ground
of the unity of the sensible world. Both are motivated by an interest of
reason: the former by the need for the all of sensible realities by virtue
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of the PTD, the latter by the need for a ground of unity by virtue of
reason’s interest in systematic unity. However, only the second illusion
is of regulative use for reason.
7. Conclusion
In this article, I have taken issue with the widely held view that the
possibility proof in Kant’s pre-Critical Beweisgrund somehow survives
in the form of the transcendental illusion that he exposes in section
two of the Ideal. However, this illusion bears important differences to
the possibility proof. The illusion seeks to establish a Spinozistic God
and is motivated not by the need for an absolutely necessary being to
ground possibility, but by the need for supplying conceptual content
for the thoroughgoing determination of a thing. The much neglected
proof a posteriori from Beweisgrund, on the contrary, anticipates the
physico-theological proof, which in turn gives rise to a different transcen-
dental illusion, according to which God must be the ground of the order
of the world.
Let us return to the passage quoted from Th-Pölitz that we considered at
the beginning. We can now see that the account in this transcript differs
markedly from the Critique. For the transcript reads that all things
‘presuppose a being that contains all realities in itself and that through
the limitation of these realities must have constituted these things’,
which the transcript identifies with the ‘ground of proof’ exhibited in
Beweisgrund (: ). But this depiction of the possibility proof is
clearly incorrect. The proof argues that the highest being is the real
ground of worldly realities, but has nothing to say about limitation.
Nor does the quotation from the transcript agree with the Critique.
There, Kant distinguishes between the grounding relation by which the
totality of sensible realities makes the limitation of sensible concepts
possible and the grounding relation by which God grounds worldly
possibilities. Since students’ notes are at least somewhat unreliable,
we should not take for granted that Kant speaks so highly about the
possibility proof unless the evidence from Th-Pölitz can be corroborated
by other sources. But this is not the case. So we have to assume that
the account in this transcript is an inadequate representation of
Kant’s view.
It is perhaps an unfortunate result that this leaves us without an explan-
ation why Kant abandoned the possibility proof in theCritique. But there
is no reason why he should give an account of it. What we should expect,
on the contrary, is an explanation why Kant holds that the possibility
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proof is not only wrong, but not even a proof of God. But since Kant
should have given such an account even if he had transformed the proof
into a transcendental illusion, competing interpretations face the same
problem. I have not investigated the fate of the possibility proof, but only
argued that the proof does not survive in any form in the Critique.
Notes
 SeeOPA, : –, . As is customary, I quote fromKant according to volume and page
numbers of the Akademie edition; the Critique of Pure Reason, however, is quoted
according to the pagination of the A and B edition. Translations are from the
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, although I have often amended
them. The following abbreviations are used: CPJ = Critique of the Power of Judgement,
CPrR = Critique of Practical Reason, Met-Dohna = Metaphysics Dohna, Met-K =
Metaphysics K, Met-Mrong = Metaphysics Mrongovius, Met-Volckmann =
Metaphysics Volckmann, OPA = The Only Possible Ground of Proof, PM = On the
Progress of Metaphysics, Refl = Reflexion, RPT = On a Recently Raised Tone of
Superiority, Th-Mron = Rational Theology Mrongovius, Th-Pölitz = Rational
Theology Pölitz, Th-Volckmann = Rational Theology Volckmann.
 See A/B and A/B, also Abaci : , n. .
 For an exception see Henrich : .
 See also Th-Mron : –, and the references assembled by Chignell (: –)
and Abaci (: –; : , n. ). Chignell even holds that one relatively late
Reflexion explicitly claims that the possibility proof ‘proves’ the existence of God:
‘Reflexion  (which is from as late as ) puts it even more categorically: “The
possibility of things, which can only be regarded as determinations of a single universal
possibility, namely of the highest being, proves the existence of the realissimi as a sum
total [of realities]” (XVIII: )’ (Chignell : , n. ). But this reading is mistaken
because the verb ‘proves’ is not a success term here, but equivalent to ‘argues’ – like the
noun in, say, ‘ontological proof’, which likewise does not mean that God’s existence can
be proved by this argument. So the Reflexion does not show that Kant takes this
argument to be successful. See also note  below.
 See Chignell : , Stang : , Abaci : ; : .
 See Wood : , ; Fisher and Watkins : , –; Grier : ;
Abaci : , –; : , . The details of their account differ significantly,
though. For a comprehensive overview of the literature see Abaci : , n. ; :
, n. . Chignell (: –, –) and Stang (: , , ) even claim
that, in addition to the regulative function, the proof shows the subjective necessity of
belief (Glaube) in God. Thus, they hold that the possibility proof is basically still a
valid argument, but the mode of holding-for-true is belief instead of knowledge.
Space restrictions prevent me from engaging with their view in detail, but see note .
 The only somewhat detailed discussions of the proof I am aware of are in Schmucker
: –; Theis : –; Kanterian : –. See also Hoffer ,
who rightly emphasizes the continuity between the proof a posteriori and the regulative
use of reason in the Critique.
 Kant briefly talks about twomore proofs that he rejects, namely those that he later refers
to as the ‘ontological’ and the ‘cosmological’ proof. See OPA, : ff., as well as Theis
: – and Kanterian : – for helpful discussion.
 For detailed discussion of the possibility proof, see Schmucker : –;
Wood : –; Fisher and Watkins : –; Schönfeld : –;
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Chignell ; Stang ; : chs –; Boehm : –; Kanterian :
–; Abaci: : –.
 Boehm () holds that Kant indeed has a Spinozistic conception of God, whereas
Chignell () claims that Spinozism is unavoidable (even in the Critical period),
although Kant does not in fact accept this conception of God.
 For a more detailed defence of this view, see Yong : –; Hoffer : –;
Stang : –.
 It is not easy to understand the relation of the first two sections of Beweisgrund to each
other. On the one hand, Kant says that the first section presents ‘the ground of proof
itself’, whereas the second depicts ‘the extensive use of it’ (OPA, : ). This may give
the impression that the proof a posteriori is not independent of the possibility proof.
On the other hand, Kant explicitly distinguishes these proofs in the third section of
Beweisgrund (OPA, : –). I take it that, since only the possibility proof is suitable
for a strict demonstration, the second section depicts the use of the possibility proof
insofar as only this proof can strictly establish the existence of God as the Wise
Author of nature (which is needed for the purpose of laying the foundations for an
improved method of physico-theology). Nevertheless, the second section also presents
a proof different from the possibility proof.
 Compare OPA, : –, with Met-Mron, : . Since the laws of geometry are
grounded by God, they can belong to the basis of a proof a posteriori without being
empirical. By presenting proofs a priori and a posteriori of God’s existence, Kant follows
the tradition of Wolff and others (see Abaci : ).
 As Hoffer (: ) points out, Kant appears to use ‘essence’ and ‘internal possibility’
interchangeably in Beweisgrund.
 The referent of ‘it’ (desselben) is of itself unclear, but the context ensures that Kant is
speaking about God.
 See also OPA, : , and Theis : ; Kanterian : –.
 See Wood : –; Longuenesse : –; : –; Grier : –;
Allison : –; Abaci : –; : –; Willaschek : –;
also my : –.
 Some concepts contain covert transcendental negations: <being blind> means the
absence of the sense of seeing (which is a reality), so it actually means: <being non-
seeing>. See A/B.
 See RPT : –n., also PM (and lose Blätter), : , , –, Met-Volckmann,
: , Met-Dohna, : –, Met-K, : –, Th-Mron, : –.
 SeeGrier : ; Allison : –; Longuenesse: ; Stang : , n. ;
Abaci:–;:.However, these authorsdonot note that this claimamounts
to a distinction between an illegitimate and a legitimate conception of God, probably
because Kant does not explicitly distinguish between these conceptions in the Ideal.
 This does not mean that the ens realissimum in the illegitimate sense cannot also be the
ground of possibility (see note ). But this would not free God from limitations, so the
concept remains illegitimate even then.
 See CPJ, : –, Met-Volckmann, : –, Met-Dohna, : –, .
 See Wood : –.
 See also Refl , : , Met-Volckmann, : , Th-Volckmann, : ,
Th-Mron, : . Kant’s claim that there cannot be pure realities in the world is
ambitious and he argues for this view mainly in his lectures. The general idea is that
the world of sense has the forms of space and time, and all realities that occur in space
and time must be limited. See RPT, : n., Met-K, : –, Th-Volckmann,
: –, Th-Mron, : .
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 See A/B. I discuss this issue at length in my .
 See Henrich : –; Longuenesse : –; Grier : ; Allison :
; Abaci : –; : .
 See Wood : – for helpful discussion. As should be clear, this notion has its
origin in Leibniz.
 Granted, Kant does not make this (plausible) premise explicit, but it is needed to make
the argument work. Otherwise, the whole of limited concepts would presuppose some
unlimited realities, but not all of them, and hence not the whole concept of God.
 Although Kant does not make it clear, I assume that limitation is still a conceptual and
not a metaphysical relation.
 Strictly speaking, God’s complete consequences also include noumenal realities, but
these can be neglected here because they are not epistemically accessible to us.
 I criticized Kant for what I took to be his derivation of sensible from divine realities in my
: – and argued that this is impossible if, as he holds, sensible realities are
essentially spatiotemporal. Now I realize that Kant’s view that we must derive sensible
concepts from the complete consequences of God may be an attempt to avoid this
problem. Still, it is not clear that the conception of an all of sensible realities is coherent
if sensible realities cannot be separated from negations.
 Guyer and Wood translate diese as ‘these possibilities’, but grammatically the demon-
strative could refer either to ‘all possibility of the things’ or to ‘the highest reality’.
To my mind, the second reading makes more sense because it fits better the series of
illusions, as presented below.
 See Grier : –, in particular –, also Abaci : –; : –.
 See A–/B–. For more detailed discussion, see Grier : –; Stang :
–; Abaci : –; : –.
 I take it that Kant is making a transition here from determining a complete concept with
regard to all possible realities to determining it with regard to all possible sensible
realities. This seems to be part of the illusion that the all of sensible realities is the all
of realities in general (see below). A question that Kant does not even seem to raise,
though, would be what the all of sensible reality consists in, given that no sensible
predicate is purely positive (see note ).
 This is why Kant refers back to the Transcendental Analytic (see A/B). There
(that is, in the Postulates), he argues that we can become acquainted with the
matter of possibility only by experience (see A/B–). See Abaci : ;
: .
 As regards the fact that there is this illusion, I agree with Grier : –; Stang :
–; and Abaci : –; : ; although their reasoning differs from mine.
 It is for this reason that Kant writes in Refl , ‘The possibility of things, which can
only be regarded as determinations of a single universal possibility, namely of the highest
being, proves the existence of the realissimi as a sum total.’ (: , n. ). Kant considers
the possibilities of things as limitations (or ‘determinations’, which in this context comes
to the same) of the sum total of realities because the realities that some worldly thing
instantiates are a subset of the all of sensible realities. However, the proof is unsuccessful
because the latter is demanded by reason, but cannot be fully instantiated.
 See A/B. It is only here that Kant uses the term ‘natural illusion’. I extend the use
of it to the whole series of missteps of reason that he discusses in section two.
 Again, it must be noted that the idea of the all of sensible reality may be incoherent; and it
is unclear whether the totality of positive sensible concepts is actually different from the
totality of sensible concepts. See notes  and .
 As we shall see later, this is the view held by some readers.
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 Kant makes these illusions more explicit in a later section. He calls the first illusion an
‘entirely natural (though not for this reason secure) inference’ (A/B) and the
second a ‘dialectical but natural illusion’ (A/B).
 See Grier : –, –; Allison : ; Abaci : –; : .
Willaschek, on the contrary, agrees with me that ‘the function of Section Three’ is ‘to
prepare the discussion of the three proofs of God’s existence’ (Willaschek : ,
n. ), but does not seem to distinguish between a legitimate and an illegitimate concep-
tion ofGod (–, similarlyHenrich : –). This apparentlymakes him think
that the illusion in section two is just part of the formation of the concept of God, without
resulting in a transcendental error (see Willaschek : , n. ).
 On Allison’s view, the ‘first [illusion treats] the how or what we might term the mecha-
nism of hypostatization and the second the why or the motivation for it’ (Allison :
, see also –). But this wrongly presupposes that these illusions deal with the
same conception of God. Abaci holds that the natural course of reason adds the illusion
that sensible realities are grounded by God to the illusion that these realities are God (see
Abaci : –; : –). But if these illusions belong together, then this would
mean that God grounds himself, which is clearly not Kant’s intention. I am less sure
about Grier’s view, but I take it that she thinks that the sum total is also the ground
of reality, according to the illusion (see Grier : ). But this reading is impossible:
although the last step of the natural illusion in section twomakes God into an intelligence
that grounds the unity of appearances (see A/Bn. and Grier : ), this
would be an unacceptable reading of section three because it would leave us without
a consistent concept of God.
 Grier worries that there would be ‘no one clearly defined idea’ of God in this case
(: ). But since Kant considers only one idea legitimate, I do not see the problem.
 See Chignell : –, who makes this point with regard to Kant’s use of the term in
Beweisgrund.
 Again, we have to distinguish between dialectical illusions and dialectical errors. The
illusions that there must be an absolutely necessary being and that this being is the most
real being are not yet errors. I take it that the natural course of reason is a series of errors
that happens when we fall prey to the illusions. Nonetheless, the natural course is best
understood not as a proof itself, but as the psychological process of adopting these
dialectical views.
 Importantly, Kant is speaking about a harmony in, or between, ‘natures’; this suggests
that he has a non-moral order in mind. This reading will get further support in the
discussion to follow.
 See A–/B–. The physico-theological proof is rarely discussed in the literature,
but see Wood : –, –, and Pasternack a: –, with whose
accounts I generally agree.
 This is opposed to the contingent arrangement of matter, which merely concerns the
form. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this.
 To be sure, Kant does not make explicit that he is beginning to discuss a second
argument, so one might doubt that there are in fact two different arguments.
However, if there were just one argument, Kant could have stopped the discussion when
he established that the physico-theological proof could at best prove the existence of a
world architect; the rest of the discussion would be redundant at best and inconsistent
at worst.
 I largely follow Grier’s insightful reading of the regulative use of reason in this section
(see Grier : ch. , especially –, –, also Stang : –). For
accounts of the connection between the regulative use of reason and God’s grounding
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of possibility that are similar to mine, see Wood : –; Grier : –;
Chignell : –; Pasternack a: –; b: –; Stang :
–, , ; Abaci : ; Hoffer .
 See A/B, A–/B–, A/B. Kant explains the difference between
‘constitutive’ and ‘regulative’ principles in A–/Bff.
 To be sure, this raises the question why this unity is impossible in experience,
which I cannot address here.
 As mentioned in note , Chignell and Stang think that the demands of reason justify not
only the regulative use of the idea of God, but even belief in God in the specific Kantian
sense. This is true for the first Critique, but wrong for the third. In the first Critique,
Kant holds that the regulative use of reason justifies what he calls ‘doctrinal belief’
(A/B; Kant discusses doctrinal belief in A–/B–). But in later work,
the notion of ‘doctrinal belief’ not only disappears (seeCPJ, : –, RPT : –n.),
Kant even states that the great unity and harmony of the world does not justify Belief
because the existence of a creator would only be ‘the most adequate opinion and hypoth-
esis for our reason’ (CPJ, : ). The ‘principles of speculative reason’ are merely
‘regulative’ because they ‘do not impose [speculative reason] to assume a new object
above experience, but only to approximate the use of reason in experience to
completeness’ (CPrR, : ). So Kant’s new view is that the regulative use of reason
does not justify belief of any sort.
 To be sure, Kant says that the PTD ‘prescribes to the understanding the rule of its
complete use’ (A/B), which shows that it has a legitimate, regulative use (see also
Willaschek : ). But the flawed conception of God discussed in section two is only
achieved after a series of illusions of which the PTD is only the first step; and this series as
a whole is of no regulative use.
 Furthermore, the transcript blurs the difference between the possibility proof and the
proof a posteriori (see Th-Pölitz, : –).
 This should not come as a surprise, though. It must have been even more difficult for
Kant’s listeners to distinguish the different argumentative threads than it is for his
readers; and he may also have been less precise when he talked about his account than
in writing.
 For helpful comments, I would like to thank the participants of a colloquium meeting in
 at Humboldt University of Berlin led by Reed Winegar, as well as several referees
for this journal. I am also grateful for the feedback I received when I presented my initial
ideas to Rosalind Chaplin, Joe Stratmann and Eric Watkins.
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